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Abstract 
This working paper investigates the reasons underpinning the growing use and widespread resonance 
of the concept of ‘civilizations’ – defined by cultural and religious markers – in scholarly, policy and 
public discourses, since the end of the Cold War. Such an inquiry is made all the more relevant since 
the concept of civilizations has not only remained at the level of language. It has, in fact, become 
embedded, instantiated, and operationalized within the global governance architecture, most 
prominently with the creation of the UN Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) in 2005. The UNAOC 
represents a remarkable development in the way international order is being understood and upheld 
within global governance institutions, as no longer solely dependent on states, or on the advancement 
of individual rights and economic opportunities, but also on what occurs between and within 
civilizations. Why have discourses and practices about civilizations acquired the political salience they 
have in international society at this historical juncture? This paper argues for an understanding of the 
concept of civilizations as a particular kind of ‘empty signifier’, underpinned by three overarching 
logics: a logic of interpretation centered on identity, a logic of critique towards liberal ‘end of history’ 
narratives and projects, and a logic of practicality that matches the interests of multiple state and non-
state actors. This argument is empirically illustrated through an analysis of how these three logics, 
which explain the contemporary power and authority of the signifier of civilizations, also structure the 
mission, bureaucratic apparatus, and operations of the UNAOC. 
Keywords 
Civilizations, United Nations, Identity, Empty Signifier, Practice 
 
 1 
“It would be pleasant to be able to define the word ‘civilization’ simply and precisely, as one defines a straight 
line, a triangle or a chemical element. The vocabulary of the social sciences, unfortunately, scarcely permits 
decisive definitions. Not that everything is uncertain or in flux: but most expressions, far from being fixed for ever, 
vary from one author to another, and continually evolve before our eyes.” P.3 
Fernand Braudel (1995, 3) 
 “Civilizational analysis is important not least because the concept of civilization is being used. It seems, at this 
historical juncture, that the notion of civilization is a significant carrier of knowledge and of thereby attendant 
preferences and policies.” 
Martin Hall (2007, 199) 
The notion that what occurs within and between civilizations – largely defined around cultural and 
religious markers – matters in world politics, has gained considerable ground in scholarly, policy and 
public debates since the end of the Cold War. This development is most visibly represented not only 
by the wide resonance that Huntington’s controversial thesis of civilizational clashes has had over the 
past two decades (see BBC 2013; Foreign Affairs 2013), but also in the very institutionalization and 
operationalization of the UN Alliance of Civilizations (from now on UNAOC or the Alliance).  
The UNAOC was established in 2005 with a vision to “work towards a more peaceful, more 
socially inclusive world, by building mutual respect among peoples of different cultural and religious 
identities” and to contribute “to reject extremism and embrace diversity.”1 It seeks to support “broader 
efforts to ameliorate identity based crises” and portrays itself as a “leading United Nations platform 
for intercultural dialogue, understanding and cooperation”.2 The Alliance claims both “a global scope 
underpinned by a universal perspective,” while also placing a particular focus “on addressing relations 
between Western and Muslim societies” (United Nations 2007, 5). 
The UNAOC is the product of a joint diplomatic effort between José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, 
former Prime Minister of Spain,
3
 with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister of Turkey, actively 
backed by the then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Today the Alliance boasts a growing number 
of initiatives – ranging from high-level global conferences, to media activities and educational 
campaigns, to grass roots programs – involving a wide range of actors – states, international and 
regional organizations, civil society groups, scholars, religious leaders and organizations, foundations, 
the media and the private sector – aimed at helping to “reduce cross-cultural tensions and to build 
bridges between communities” 4 from the local to the regional and global levels. As Thomas Uthup 
(2010, 407) argues, the UNAOC is “one of the key international actors involved in the complex 
interplay between intercultural relations and global politics”. 
UNAOC initiatives are coordinated by a secretariat based in the UN headquarters in New York and 
headed by a High Representative,
5
 who reports directly to the UN Secretary General. Much of the 
Alliance’s agenda and programmatic guidelines were laid out in a report drafted by a High Level 
Group composed of leading figures in the fields of politics, academia, civil society, religion, 
international finance, and media from all regions of the world.
6
 The UNAOC also counts on the 
                                                     
1
 http://www.unaoc.org/who-we-are/ (accessed 02/07/2014). For the UNAOC’s timeline see http://www.unaoc.org/who-
we-are/history/timeline/ (accessed 02/07/2014). 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Zapatero put on the international agenda the idea of an “Alliance of Civilizations between the Western and the Arab and 
Muslim worlds” during the 59th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2004. For Zapatero’s speech 
see http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/59/statements/spaeng040921.pdf (accessed 02/07/2014) 
4
 http://www.unaoc.org/who-we-are/ (accessed 02/07/2014) 
5
 Jorge Sampaio, former President of Portugal, was the first High Representative between 2007-2013, followed by Nassir 
Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, a diplomat of Qatar with a long experience at the UN and President of the Sixty-sixth session the 
UN General Assembly in 2011-2012.  
6
 For the High Level Group report see Alliance of Civilizations (2006) on the members see http://www.unaoc.org/who-we-
are/high-level-group/ (accessed 02/07/2014) 
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political and financial support of a Group of Friends, a community of countries and international 
organizations which have signed up to promote the Alliance’s objectives. 
Overall, the UNAOC represents a remarkable institutional change within the structures of the UN 
system. The UN has long been an organization whose primary goals are to ensure peace and security 
among and within nations, promote individual human rights, and reduce worldwide poverty. The 
Alliance, however, represents a novel development in the way international order is being understood 
and upheld, as no longer solely dependent on states, or on the advancement of individual rights and 
economic opportunities, but also on the state of intra- and inter-civilizational relations.  
The interpretation of the UNAOC offered here, as representing a significant departure from 
standard ways of thinking and doing international relations, is not an entirely novel claim (see Bettiza 
2014; Marchetti 2009; Michael and Petito 2009; Lachmann 2011). What has received far less 
attention, however, is why this way of thinking about and acting upon international politics has 
emerged in the first place, acquiring growing and persistent authority over time in the global public 
sphere and within global governance institutions. Most investigations into the UNAOC rarely, if ever, 
tackle this issue.  
There are, for instance, a number of accounts that seek to explain, contextualize, critique or justify 
the UNAOC’s emergence. A first line of explanation stresses the ideational and intellectual roots 
underpinning the Alliance. Some emphasize, here, the problematic and misplaced influence played by 
Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis (Balci 2009). The thrust of Huntington’s (1993a, 
1993b, 1996) argument was that in the post-Cold War era, international conflict would be defined by 
cultural and civilizational fault lines, notably between the West on the one hand and the Islamic as 
well as Sinic worlds on the other. 
It is further possible to point at the constructive role played, instead, by a wide range of normative 
proposals and initiatives for dialogue advanced by scholars and intellectuals, not simply as a reaction 
to Huntington, but as a legitimate autonomous alternative intellectual tradition of understanding world 
politics (Dallmayr 2002; Dallmayr and Manoochehri 2007; Esposito and Voll 2000; Forst and Ahmed 
2005; Kayaoğlu 2012; Lynch 2000; Michael and Petito 2009; Petito 2011, 2007). Here, the 
development of the UNAOC can be considered as “the latest phase in the evolving discussion of 
‘intercultural dialogue’ at the UN-level” (Bloom 2013, 3), most prominently revitalized in the 1990s 
by former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami (1997, 2000; Khatami, van Ess, and Küng 2001) and 
his proposal to designate 2001 as the year of the Dialog among Civilizations. Overall, these scholars 
and political leaders sought to emphasize the possibility of engagement and cooperation across 
civilizational boundaries. 
A second line of explanation, not necessarily mutually exclusive to the first, generally emphasizes 
the role played by contingent factors, historical events and political interests. The moment when the 
UNAOC was launched was key. This was at the height of perceived growing Western-Muslim 
tensions in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the Bush administration’s 
controversial War on Terror and Iraq campaign. These events appeared, to many, as turning 
Huntington’s scholarly thesis into present day reality. As a consequence they also opened a window of 
opportunity for civilizational dialogue proposals to be energetically put forward on the international 
policy agenda and institutionalized at the UN (Camilleri and Martin 2014, 5; see also Balci 2009; 
Kausch and Barre ada 2005).  
Political leaders’ interests were fundamental too. Khatami, who was at the forefront of diplomatic 
proposal for dialogue already in the 1990s, was moved as much by personal normative convictions as 
well as an interest in strengthening his hand domestically vis-à-vis reactionary political opponents 
while internationally presenting Iran as a possible partner of the West (Bettiza and Dionigi 2014, 10-
11). In light also of the 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, Zapatero of Spain wanted to sharply distance 
his government from the previous one, led by José María Aznar, which had largely backed and 
supported America’s war in Iraq (Barreñada 2006, 99-100). Erdogan, had his own agenda too, 
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reaching out to European partners whose favorable stance was sought-after during European Union 
accession talks, while also presenting himself as a leading and reliable spokesperson for the Muslim 
word in a regional and international context (Balcı and Miş 2008). 
Yet, these explanations – the role of intellectuals, historical events, leaders’ interests –contribute to 
raising even more questions than they answer. Why did the theory of one Harvard-based academic 
first published on the pages of Foreign Affairs, despite being repeatedly rejected and undermined by 
equally prestigious scholars on the pages of the same journal or comparably influential outlets,
7
 struck 
such a widespread and lasting chord in the first place? Why was there an intellectual movement, 
developed over the past two decades, which took seriously the ambiguous and controversial concept of 
civilizations, not only in the persona of Huntington, but also by all those promoting a view and 
framework of dialogue? Why have discourses of civilizational identities progressively come to 
resonate and gain authority in intellectual, policy, and political circles as broadly as they have, not 
only after, but also before 9/11 and the events that followed?  
Moreover, the fact that civilizational discourses were already in place before 9/11, does not mean 
that they necessarily would be adopted and institutionalized at the UN thereafter, a time when the 
practice of “de-mythicizing” (Balci 2009, 98-99) civilizational narratives was well underway. In fact, 
intellectuals and policy-makers debating the creation of the UNAOC showed a clear understanding of 
the multiple problems and shortcomings, already voiced by the critics of civilizations discourses, of 
endorsing a civilizational frame of reference: from the risks of essentializing and objectifying 
civilizational differences as well as potentially mirroring and legitimizing clash narratives (Camilleri 
and Martin 2014, 1 -14; Kausch and Barre ada 2005, 2-3).  
Why, despite this reflexive self-awareness, many intellectuals and policy-makers still found 
civilizational discourses and dialogical initiatives to be a viable and necessary solution for advancing 
international peace and security? Moreover, why did political leaders find discourses about 
civilizations – either in clash as in the case of the Bush administration or Al Qaeda, or dialogue as in 
the case of Khatami, Zapatero, and Erdogan – to be a valuable and legitimate reservoir of meanings to 
draw upon and deploy, more or less instrumentally, for advancing their diverse purposes and agendas? 
Finally, why did a worldview and initiative around managing intra- and inter-civilizational relations 
and perceptions, sustained by a small group of intellectuals and political leaders, progressively gain 
traction within the UN where either the particularist interests of states or the general ones of humanity 
tend to dominate the agenda instead? 
To sum up, there are many interpretations of world politics that are regularly articulated yet only 
few resonate globally and acquire international normative and political traction. Why, have discourses 
about clash and dialogue of civilizations struck such a widespread chord in international society, both 
before and after 9/11, ultimately becoming institutionalized in global governance initiatives such as 
the UNAOC? Moreover, if many of today’s supposed civilizations have a long historical pedigree 
(Eisenstadt 1986), why have civilizational categories and identities acquired particular salience in the 
consciousness and rhetoric of international political actors at this particular moment in time?  
Martin Hall, in the quote that opens this paper, perceptively suggests that the concept of civilization 
is being used at this historical juncture because it is a “significant carrier of knowledge”. This paper 
seeks to explore and push this argument further. It argues for an understanding of the concept of 
civilizations as an ‘empty signifier’. It is this quality of an empty signifier, that accounts for concept’s 
(re)emergence, widespread use, resonance, and ultimately its institutionalization within the UN system 
                                                     
7
 Few social scientists and theorists have endorsed Huntington’s arguments. Among the many leading scholars that, 
instead, directly refuted his thesis, see Adib-Moghaddam (2011); Halliday (2002); Ikenberry (1997); Said (2001); Sen 
(2006); Walt (1997); see also (Foreign Affairs 2013); Hoge (2010). Beyond these powerful theoretical and philosophical 
critiques of Huntington’s thesis, a range of empirical studies have questioned also the empirical validity of civilizational 
clashes (Chiozza 2002; Fox 2002; Henderson and Tucker 2002). 
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following the end of the Cold War. This said, the concept of civilizations while being an empty 
signifier, it not a signifier for anything, but is instead a carrier of particular kinds of knowledge. 
Civilizations captures, brings together, and gives meaning to a disparate number of objective trends, 
subjective interpretations, normative orientations, and interests at work at this juncture in international 
society.  
The empty signifier of civilizations is underpinned, I would argue, by three distinct logics. First, at 
a time of rapid change and globalization, civilizations provide a particular interpretive framework that 
marks an important shift towards an identity-centered mode of understanding and explaining world 
politics as an alternative to more established modes of thinking. These include, for instance, the state-
centrism of standard International Relations (IR) theories, the economic-centrism of neo-liberal and 
Marxist perspectives, and the individual-centrism of the human rights discourse. I call this first logic, 
the ‘logic of interpretation’. Second, references to civilizations in world politics act as an important 
catalyst for a range of, deeply normative, critiques directed towards globalization processes and the 
structures and agents of the liberal international order. I call this the ‘logic of critique’. Thirdly, 
civilizational discourses have a practical logic, that is, they are seen as useful by a wide range of more 
or less powerful actors in world politics at this time in history. I call this the ‘logic of practicality’.  
Overall, this research is animated by an interest in understating and explaining the salience, power, 
and authority of the signifier of civilizations as this historical juncture in scholarly and public 
discourses. It is not concerned with proposing a genealogy of the concept of civilizations (O’Hagan 
2002) or a historical overview of the field of civilizational analysis (Arnason 2003). Neither is the 
paper interested in exploring the origins, dynamics and relations of plural civilizations as objective 
entities across time and space in the social world (Braudel 1995; Eisenstadt 2003, 1986; Hobson 2004; 
Huntington 1996; Katzenstein 2010a, 2012a, 2012b; Puchala 1997; Toynbee and Somervell 1946). 
Nor is the paper concerned with civilization in the singular as a process (Elias 1994; Linklater 2010) 
or a politically expedient discourse (Bowden 2009; Gong 1984; Jackson 2006; Salter 2002; Suzuki 
2009) that separates the civilized from the uncivilized.
8
 Lastly, the paper also does not seek to provide 
yet another critique of Huntington’s thesis,9 nor to advance arguments for (Esposito and Voll 2000; 
Kose 2009; Lynch 2000) or against (Balci 2009; Salt 2008; Tsutsumibayashi 2005) the necessity of 
inter-civilizational dialogues at the UN or more broadly.  
The paper’s main focus, and thus contribution, is directed towards understanding and explaining 
why talking about and acting upon the notion that what occurs within and between a plurality of 
civilizations, generally defined along cultural and religious markers, has become a fixture of world 
politics – particularly following the end of the Cold War. Put differently, starting from the observation 
that discourses, institutions and practices around civilizations are spreading – most remarkably and 
emblematically in the case of the UNAOC – the paper seeks to unpack the deeper and wider processes 
that underpin such changes.  
The study is based on an analysis of the concept of civilizations as it is used in scholarly and public 
debates, and its application to global governance initiatives such as the UNAOC. Theoretically, it is 
situated in the recent constructivist turn towards practices, in general (Adler and Pouliot 2011; 
Neumann 2002), and how imaginaries of civilizations become constitutive, and constituted by, 
international institutions and practices in and on the material world, in particular (Bettiza 2014 
forthcoming, 2014). Methodologically, data and information have been collected from a range of 
sources. These sources include: secondary sources such as books, articles, and reports on civilizational 
analysis in general and the UNAOC in particular; primary sources such as speeches and documents by 
political leaders and high-level policymakers; a review of UNAOC institutional structure and 
                                                     
8
 It is important to stress, however, that the two concepts of civilizations in the plural and civilization in the singular are not 
mutually exclusive. Their meanings, as we shall see, may and do often overlap in scholarly and public debates. 
9
 For an overview of this literature, see footnote 7. 
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operations collected mostly through information available on the website; a semi-structured interviews 
with selected scholars and officials involved, currently or in the past, in UNAOC activities; and a ten 
day field mission in New York in June 2014. 
This working paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the concept of civilizations 
as a particular kind of empty signifier. It relates this signifier to certain interpretative, critical, and 
practical logics. The conceptual argument is further illustrated in the second part of the paper through 
a close analysis of the institutional arrangements, discourses and practices of the UNAOC. This 
section explores how the empty signifier of civilizations is instantiated and operationalized in the 
global governance policy arena. The Alliance is chosen because it represents one of the most striking 
institutional embodiments of, as well as exemplifying many of the dynamics and tensions embedded 
in, the signifier of civilizations as it is understood and employed at this historical juncture. The final 
section concludes with some reflections on the future prospects of the concept of civilizations, in 
general, and the Alliance, in particular.  
Civilizations: Three Logics of an ‘Empty Signifier’ 
Why has the concept of civilizations – along with discourses of civilizational clashes and dialogues – 
been increasingly adopted in scholarly, policy and public debates since the end of the Cold War? This 
section attempts to answer this puzzling question in two steps. First, by arguing for an understanding 
of the concept of civilizations as an ‘empty signifier’ of a particular kind. Second, by laying out three 
logics that the signifier of civilizations captures and addresses, which explain its meteoric rise and 
growing resonance over the past decades.  
Empty Signifiers 
So far in the IR literature, civilizations have been presented as an ‘ideal model’ (Marchetti 2009), a 
‘strategic frame of reference’ (Petito 2011), or as an ‘imagined community’ (Bettiza 2014; O’Hagan 
2002). I propose here to further understand the concept of civilizations as an empty signifier. The 
notion of an empty signifier has been developed in semiotics and in the field of post-structural 
discourse analysis.
10
 According to Daniel Chandler (Online), an empty signifier is:  
“…variously defined as a signifier with a vague, highly variable, unspecifiable or non-existent 
signified. Such signifiers mean different things to different people: they may stand for many or 
even any signifieds; they may mean whatever their interpreters want them to mean”.  
A key issue here is the extent to which there is an actual signified, or none, that the signifier refers to. 
More post-structural theoretical perspectives tend to view empty signifiers as pointing to no actual 
object signified in the real world, compared instead to a concept over which there is no agreed upon 
meaning but that is still related to a signified. Despite these disagreements, it is important to note that, 
as Rachel Walker (1989, 182) argues, “the word ‘empty’ is something of a misnomer” because often 
we deal with terms which actually “[overflow] with meaning”. Meanings may shift from context to 
context and from time to time. The puzzle then, is to unpack and identify what kind of meanings does 
a particular signifier bring together and refer to. 
Empty signifiers also have a number of important political implications and functions. For Ernesto 
Laclau (1996), empty signifiers are a product of power and ensure hegemonic relations. Their purpose 
‘‘is to give a particular demand a function of universal representation” (Laclau 1996, 57). As Dirk 
Nabers (2009, 196) highlights, “The more specific the content of a signifier becomes, the more it will 
be contested, which leads to the failure of a hegemonic project…Power and the ability to rule will thus 
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 In debates within and close to IR, the notion of an empty signifier has been applied in different ways and for different 
cases, for instance, to the concepts of ‘governance’ (Offe 2009), ‘climate protection’ (Methmann 2010), ‘francophonie’ 
(Glasze 2007), or ‘freedom’ (Nabers 2009).  
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depend on an actor’s skill to present his own particular world view as compatible with the communal 
aims”. Secondly, the capacity of empty signifiers to be “sufficiently broad or ‘universal’” also allows 
“particular identities to use the term to form political alliances” (Townshend 2003, 132). Put 
differently, empty signifiers “can have different meanings and can thereby serve to unite disparate 
social movements” (Nabers 2009, 196). Finally, the vague nature of empty signifiers, enables its 
content to be filled in many ways and thereby to be appropriated not only by multiple actors, but also 
for a variety of deffirent purposes.  
The term civilizations, I argue, has become salient in public discourses only marginally because it 
purports to capture ontologically real civilizations and their dynamics in world politics. An important 
feature of the concept of civilizations is that it functions very much as an empty signifier. This is not to 
say, that – despite all the recognized complexities and difficulties inherent in identifying and defining 
what civilizations are, what they do, how many exist, where their boundaries lie, and who its 
representatives are – civilizations are not understood by some scholars or political leaders as objective 
signifieds, which exert powerful influences and forces in international society. What I am suggesting 
is that the widespread adoption of a highly contested concept and category such as that of civilizations 
in policy and political debates, is largely unrelated to the supposed real existence and effects of certain 
units of analysis or cultural contexts which remain, even for its most committed and closest observers, 
largely underdetermined.  
As an empty signifier, civilizations brings together in a unified discourse a range of heterogeneous 
and often contradictory actors, practices, and interests. The concept can be implicated in hegemonic, 
as well as counter-hegemonic projects. It further circumscribes the terms around which disagreements 
as well as coalitions can occur. As Mustapha Tlili (2014, personal communication) suggests:  
“Civilization should be understood as a sort of category for understanding the world, this category 
then becomes used also for practical purposes. It allows to understand, but also misunderstand and 
to manage the understanding and misunderstanding. We should see civilization more as a category 
of logic than a substance.” 
While the vagueness of the notion of civilizations contributes in important ways to its popularity, it is 
important to stress that what we are dealing with is a structured vagueness. That is, the notion of 
civilizations is a carrier of certain meanings and understandings, but not others. It permits certain 
modes of thought and action, but not others. What does the empty signifier of civilizations, or as a 
‘category of logic’ as Tlili puts it, thus stand for and do? What meanings and knowledge is it a carrier 
of and what functions does it absolve at this historical moment? Put differently, what is civilizations a 
signifier of and for?  
Three logics 
I argue that references to civilizations are mostly being used because they capture certain 
interpretative, critical, and practical logics at work internationally during a time of dramatic global 
change since the end of the Cold War. In other words, civilizations, as an empty signifier, resonates 
because it is constitutive of a particular way of interpreting world politics, and of particular normative 
orientations and political projects, which have gained ground over the past two to three decades.  
First, civilizations provide a particular interpretive framework that marks a shift towards an 
identity-centered mode of understanding and explaining world politics. This is an alternative mode of 
thinking about the international compared to those that generally dominate scholarly and public 
discussions, namely state-centrism (standard IR theories), economic-centrism (neo-liberal and Marxist 
perspectives), and individual-centrism (human rights discourses). In other words, at the core of 
civilizational discourses is the notion that identity matters, for better or worse, in world politics.  
As Raffaele Marchetti (2009, 147) highlights, civilizations are generally intended as “the ultimate 
cultural reference, beyond any other local and national element”. Hence, for Marchetti (2009, 147), 
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“while the notion of identity is reinterpreted as multilayered, civilizational identity is acknowledged as 
the ultimate, most encompassing layer”. This echoes Huntington’s (1996, 43) observation that 
civilizations constitute, “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural 
identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species”.  
Thus, while at a first glance much of the discussions about civilizations refer to macro-cultural 
entities or contexts which are often defined in religious terms, at their core these debates often put the 
issue of identity at the center of accounts of world politics (see also Hall and Jackson 2007; O’Hagan 
2007). They do so not only for the most macro level beyond the strictures of the state, but also all the 
way down to the meso and micro levels within and beneath the state. Identity matters politically, the 
logic goes, and thus we should make this the focus of our analytical and, more or less explicitly stated, 
normative investigations.  
The trends that have pushed identity at the forefront of political analysis and discourses are 
multiple. We are living, it is commonly argued, in a world of major and rapid transformations and 
change (Held 1999; Rosenau 1990), with globalizing processes playing a critical role in dislocating, 
destabilizing, and pluralizing identities (Dunn and Goff 2004; Lapid and Kratochwil 1997; Mozaffari 
2002) and actors (Ruggie 1993; Scholte 2005; Risse 2002) within and beyond the state (see also 
Marchetti 2009). Likewise technological innovations are diffusing power and empowering individuals 
and non-state actors (Nye 2011, ch.5).  
During such transformations and unsettled periods, cultural and religious identity markers acquire 
growing social and political salience (Kinnvall 2004; Roy 2010; Swidler 1986). Previously 
homogenous societies are also becoming, thanks to transnational flows of peoples and ideas, 
increasingly culturally and religiously heterogeneous (Modood 2013). Religions are experiencing a 
public revival (Berger 1999; Casanova 1994), further contributing to re-orienting actors behaviors and 
to re-imaging their belonging along transnational and civilizational lines (Eisenstadt 2000; Petito 
2010; Shani 2008).  
As a group of extremists tore down, in the name of a religion and a transnational community of 
people, the symbols of American power on 9/11 – an event that Huntington’s thesis appeared to 
predict for some – political rhetoric would increasingly recast international relations of enmity and 
amity along distinct cultural groupings: a secular or Christian West and a religious Muslim world. 
What Huntington (1996, 37) had vividly in mind when he came up with his thesis, however, was not 
just Islam, but also the experience of Yugoslavia that disintegrated along religious and ethnic lines as 
Communist ideology and power declined.  
Within this context of change, the signifier of civilizations appears to analytically capture two 
interrelated, but also somewhat distinct, global dynamics linked to identity. What can be 
conceptualized as, respectively, the politics of identity and identity politics. First, civilizations 
discourses are a representation at the most macro level of the growing force that the politics of identity 
is acquiring internationally (Gutmann 1994; Parekh 2008). The politics of identity is linked to the 
emergence of social and political programs aimed towards the recognition, recovery or imposition of a 
particular identity at the local or global levels – whether national, cultural, ethnic, religious, or 
civilizational.  
These programs range from calls for the creation of multicultural societies, to the 
acknowledgement of indigenous and linguistic rights, disputes over the presence of religious symbols 
(be they crosses or hijabs) in public spaces, European Union constitutional debates over Christian 
roots, the re-emergence of right-wing populisms, domestic and transnational forms of Islamist politics, 
the Asian values debate, Hindu nationalism, or the spread of a range of Christian, Jewish and other 
religious fundamentalisms and orthodoxies. Civilizations discourses captures the most macro-level, 
along with it also the other lower levels, at which the politics of identity and recognition takes place. 
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Second, civilizations discourses are representative of the phenomenon of identity politics. Identity 
politics along civilizational lines appears to be linked to the need to map and order along distinct 
cultural complexes an otherwise bewildering and dizzying array of politically salient actors beyond 
simply the state which today populate the international sphere, whether: individuals (bloggers, leakers, 
converts, religious leaders), non-state organizations (social movements, NGOs, religious 
organizations, terrorist and criminal organizations, or corporations), regional organizations (the 
European Union (EU), NATO, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), or the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)) and international organizations (the UN or the World Bank).  
This process of ordering shifts attention away from a focus solely on states or, alternatively, non-
state organizations, towards instead stressing relations among peoples understood as organized 
politically along different units – be them states, but also sub-state and supra-state actors – and 
structured in part by their civilizational, cultural, and religious identity (Bettiza 2014). In other words, 
civilizational discourses help locate a multiplicity of international actors, as well as what they want 
and do, by assigning them particular identity markers.
11
  
It is within this interpretative framework then that debates regarding the state of ‘Western-Muslim 
world’ or ‘Christian-Islam’ relations, the problématique of ‘who speaks for’ the West or Muslims, or 
questions regarding what Westerners or Muslims ‘think’ of each other, acquire social and political 
meaning (see Dialogues 2006; Esposito and Mogahed 2007; Pew 2006, 2011). It is also thanks to this 
interpretative logic that it becomes possible to talk about, for instance, an NGO such as Save the 
Children, a regional organization such as the EU, and a state such as the United States as belonging 
and acting on behalf of the West; or about widely different entities such as Al Qaeda, Turkey, or the 
OIC as – more or less – legitimate representative actors of the Muslim world. In parallel, scholarly or 
public debates about civilizational clashes, often easily overlap and resonate with similar discussions 
about emerging conflicts along identity cleavages whether ethnic, sectarian, or religious. 
Overall, then, references to civilizations capture an emerging interpretative logic that understands 
and explains multiple political actors and actions as either directed towards upholding a specific 
identity (the politics of identity) or stemming from a specific identity (identity politics). Echoing this 
conclusion, is Pasquale Ferrara (2014, personal communication), Secretary General of the European 
University Institute (EUI) and former head of the Policy Planning Unit in the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, who suggests:  
“Huntington struck a chord because he appears to have identified a fundamental development in 
the international relations of the XXIst century, that what matters is not solely economic or 
military power, or the advancement of human rights and democracy, but identity. While human 
rights might have been the principal theme of the second half of the XXth century, the theme of 
collective identity – issues of recognition against globalization and economic technocracy – is the 
salient issue of today”.  
This mode of understanding world politics generates a particular set of political and policy 
problématiques with regards to the sources of international peace and security. For instance, the core 
question here is not what would be the best possible organization of political power and authority 
domestically and its defense internationally, as is the case with state-centric perspectives. Nor it is 
concerned with the merits or demerits of capitalism and markets and the measures required to reap its 
positive benefits (for neo-liberals) or curb its disastrous consequences (for Marxists) that generally 
preoccupy economic-centric approaches. It is neither consumed with identifying the appropriate 
definition and multiple expressions of individual rights and the best possible way of upholding these 
universally which marks individual-centric perspectives.  
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 The notion that identities enable and constrain state and non-state actors’ interests and behaviors is also a staple of much 
IR Constructivist literature (Katzenstein 1996; Lapid and Kratochwil 1997; Wendt 1994), which has gained growing 
traction and recognition in the field since the 1990s. 
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Its defining problématique is, instead, how to appropriately manage the dislocation, encounter, 
mixing, and overlap of diverse and plural identities at the individual, domestic, transnational, 
international and global levels. “Managing cultural, religious and civilizational differences within and 
across national borders”, Joseph Camilleri and Aran Martin (2014, 18) for instance claim, “is one of 
the defining challenges of our time”. 
The second logic that constitutes the empty signifier of civilizations, is its ability to provide an 
overarching discourse that connects a range of deeply normative critiques of globalization, the liberal 
order, and Western cultural, intellectual, economic, political and military hegemony. References to 
civilizations – both as potentially clashing or in need of dialogue – are often rooted in a critique of 
universalist and universalizing ‘end of history’ narratives and processes, especially as they 
increasingly appear to overlap with, or are explicitly applied to, American foreign policy since the end 
of the Cold War.  
This perspective draws from, and can be situated in, wider political and social theoretical debates. 
Whether communitarian and religious critiques of liberal secular universalist norms and projects 
(Dallmayr 2002; Dallmayr and Manoochehri 2007; De Bary 1998; Michael and Petito 2009; Petito 
2007; Weiming 2000), sociological critiques of singular and homogenizing modernization paradigms 
(Berger and Huntington 2003; Eisenstadt 2003), conservative skepticism of liberal utopianism and 
hubris (Huntington 1996), or post-colonial and non-Western critiques of Western economic, political 
and cultural imperialism (Esposito and Voll 2000; Hobson 2007, 2004; Tsygankov 2008).  
Huntington’s clash thesis has been much censured for its essentialist and determinist views of 
civilizations and orientalist ones of Islam. Yet few such critiques, especially those coming from a 
dialogue perspective, would disagree with a central normative concern of Huntington’s. That is, the 
late Harvard professor’s attack on “Western arrogance” manifested in its, and especially America’s, 
efforts “to promote a universal Western culture” and its “values of democracy, free markets, limited 
government, human rights, individualism, the rule of law” (Huntington 1996, 183-184). These 
attempts, while embraced by “minorities in other civilizations”, also can and do generate “widespread 
skepticism to intense opposition” by majorities in non-Western cultures (p.184). As Huntington 
bluntly concludes: “What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest” (p.184).  
To sum up, civilizations discourses underpin a generalized critique of liberal universalism, standard 
modernization and globalization paradigms, and/or Western policies that runs across a broad range of 
intellectual orientations – whether communitarian, conservative, left, religious, non-Western and post-
colonial. Critiques then differ in important ways, however, when articulated along a clash or dialogue 
perspective. Clash theorists, like Huntington, see civilizational diversity and cultural pluralism as 
incommensurable and thus a perennial source of tensions and conflicts. The best that we can hope for, 
these theorists argue, is prudence and restraint.  
Scholars and political leaders advancing a civilizational dialogue perspective, instead, generally 
value cultural pluralism, they see it as a source of enrichment and a key for building a more peaceful 
and just, less hegemonic or Western/liberal-centric, international order. What is required to reach such 
a goal, and to dispel narratives of clash, are inter-cultural and inter-faith dialogues and initiatives 
across all levels to foster greater understanding, appreciation and cooperation among actors populating 
an inescapably diverse international community (Forst and Ahmed 2005; Michael and Petito 2009; 
Dallmayr and Manoochehri 2007).  
The third logic underpinning the use and diffusion of the concept of civilizations is one of 
practicality. Civilizations are a practical empty signifier for advancing the political projects and 
interests of a wide range of powerful, as well as less powerful, state and non-state actors in world 
politics. In other words, civilizational discourses are used because they are deemed authoritative and 
thus useful. 
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Powerful actors, mostly states and their leaders, can and have employed civilizational discourses as 
convenient rhetorical tools for sustaining hegemonic projects by essentializing differences, ‘othering’ 
opponents, and legitimizing a range of security practices. The value added of the civilizations 
signifier, compared to that of culture or nation for instance, is that it also has deep moral connotations 
to it. Those employing this discourse can use it to present themselves as the defenders or promoters of 
‘civilization’ in the face of ‘barbarism’, whether across history (Adib-Moghaddam 2011; Bowden 
2009; Jackson 2006) or in present day times of heightened terrorist threats (Pasha 2007; Salter 2002). 
As Tony Blair (2007, 82) claims, the fight against extremists “is not a clash between civilizations; it is 
a clash about civilization [emphasis in original]”. Civilizational discourses, thus, can help to 
distinguish both self from other as well as right from wrong (Katzenstein 2010b, 12). 
Yet, following the critical logic embedded in the signifier of civilizations laid out above, 
civilizations discourses can also provide important ideological and rhetorical resources for counter-
hegemonic projects – especially with an anti-colonial, anti-Western, or anti-liberal slant. This is the 
case, for instance, with the ‘Asian values’ debate most prominently promoted by political leaders from 
authoritarian countries like Malaysia and Singapore emerging in opposition to the claim of the 
universality of human rights norms (Zakaria and Yew 1994). Or the anti-Western rhetoric, which 
builds upon a generalized sense of grievance and injustice for past and present wrongs, that Islamist 
actors rely upon to legitimize their diverse political programs (Ayoob 2007). Likewise Moscow is 
seeking to muster a particularist civilizational identity discourse in order to legitimize, and provide the 
ideological glue, for its regional military and institutional projects (Lukin 2014). 
Political leaders, especially from middle-range powers, may have their own incentives to employ 
the signifier of civilizations. At a time when civilizational imaginaries proliferate, those who are able 
to successfully present themselves and their countries as legitimate spokesperson for a civilization or 
as mediators between different civilizations can also gain considerable symbolic capital, in terms of 
prestige and recognition, in the domestic and international realms.  
One may still be surprised, thought, that states would adopt a civilization rhetoric given that as a 
signifier the concept generally undermines the centrality of the state in world politics. Yet, as Joseph 
Camilleri (2014, personal communication) suggests: “power is at the center of the concept of 
civilization, especially if we think of civilizations defined as a center of power encompassing a 
significant space over a significant period of time”. In other words, there is a power factor embedded 
in the concept of civilizations that states can exploit by presenting themselves as civilized, 
civilizational leaders and spokespersons, or civilizational bridges and mediators. 
A wide range of civil society actors, also have important incentives to adopt and sustain the 
civilizations signifier. As already hinted, the very notion of civilizations empowers non-state actors as 
politically salient agents in international society. Furthermore, civil society actors, whether secular or 
religious, can gain substantial symbolic power as well as economic resources, while by-passing state 
authority, if they are able to present themselves as influential representatives of a particular 
civilization – whether its armed defenders, or moderate negotiators. Some faith-based actors have a 
further incentive in the diffusion of the civilizations signifier, since it can open up greater space in 
secular and secularized domestic and global public spheres to put forward their religious voices and 
concerns.  
Finally, heads of states, civil society activists, and religious leaders have had, without doubt, 
instrumental reasons for endorsing and sustaining civilizational discourses. It is interesting to note, 
however, that it has been intellectuals and scholars (also political leaders with careers as intellectuals 
or scholars) who have had a central role in articulating and popularizing the very same concept of 
civilizations for our present times. This may not be that surprising since, as Peter Katzenstein (2010b, 
12) notes, civilizations are: “deeply meaningful to many members of the cultural elite, as self-
conscious and lived identities, civilizations do not rank at the top for most people and typically do not 
manifest themselves in an everyday sense of strong belonging”.  
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The role of Samuel Huntington is, of course, paramount here. Yet, a number of further scholars 
have been key in promoting, in scholarly and public debates, notions of dialogue among and within 
civilizations, such as Joseph Camilleri, Fred Dallmayr, John Esposito, Fabio Petito, Mustapha Tlili, Tu 
Weiming. Likewise, many prominent advocates for dialogue in the policy arena, are leaders with an 
affinity to intellectual enquiry such as Mohammad Khatami, former president of Iran and theologian, 
Vaclav Havel, former president of the Czech Republic and playwright, and Ahmet Davutoğlu, foreign 
minister of Turkey and scholar.  
For most of these elites, dialogue is seen as one of the most suitable instruments to meet the critical 
challenges of post-Cold War world politics. Dialogue – whether civilizational, cultural or religious – is 
understood as a vital tool for reducing identity-based conflicts, countering misperceptions, curbing 
extremism, increasing awareness of the other, advancing international understanding, engagement and 
cooperation, and – ultimately – creating a more peaceful and secure international society.  
These three logics – interpretative, critical, and practical – may be operating separately or together 
any time that invocations of civilizations, civilizational identities and boundaries, or civilizational 
dynamics and relations are articulated and endorsed in scholarly, policy and public discourses. 
Empirically a significant case where all three logics come together and overlap is with the UNAOC.  
The Civilizations Signifier in Practice: the Case of the UN Alliance of Civilizations 
This section explores how the multiple meanings and many of the tensions that are embedded in, and 
assigned to, the concept of civilizations – as it is used in international discourses – are reflected and 
embodied in the UNAOC. In particular, it unpacks how the interpretative, critical, and practical logics 
laid out in the section above, play out in the mission, institutional make-up, and operationalization of 
the Alliance. 
The Logic of Interpretation in Practice 
The most immediate issue pertaining to the first logic of the civilizations signifier, the ‘logic of 
interpretation’, revolves around the question of what understanding and, possibly, definition of 
civilizations is the Alliance working with, if any? In other words, is the UNAOC built around the 
recognition that there are concrete and distinct civilizations in international society, or is the concept 
of civilizations a signifier for a range of other meanings?  
A close look at UNAOC documents and reports shows no single and clear-cut use or definition of 
the concept of civilizations (see also Bloom 2013). The concept of civilizations – which in the 
Alliance is generally employed in parallel to those of culture and religion – is left vague and 
unspecified, to which a wide range of meanings are attached. Scholars and policymakers involved in 
debates leading up to the Alliance’s creation did struggle with this issue. Revelatory of this difficulty, 
is the following passage summarizing one of these preliminary debates held in Madrid in 2005:  
“No consensus could be reached as to what might be a suitable definition of the term 
“civilization”, despite its being excessively used. Hence, several participants were in favour of 
dropping the term, since it allowed for too many interpretations” (Kausch and Barre ada 2005, 
17). 
These same preliminary debates as well as UNAOC founding documents however reveal that despite 
its character as a controversial and contested empty signifier, the concept of civilizations helps to 
capture something meaningful. Civilizational discourses are generally linked to the key role which 
‘identities’, and ‘perceptions’ of ‘self and other’ appear to be playing in world politics in the XXIst 
century (UNAOC 200 , 8; Kausch and Barre ada 2005, 4). This tension between civilizations as an 
objective category and its role as an empty signifier for identity issues, is then carried forward in the 
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very same practices of the Alliance itself. As Thomas Uthup (2014, personal communication), who 
served as Research and Education Manager for the UNAOC between 2008-2011, argues: 
“Our objective at the Alliance was not to point out what civilization meant. The term ‘civilization’ 
was not used very much in the day-to-day work. The way I saw it, is that we would mostly focus 
on actions, and on actions towards ‘the other’”. 
While the logic of identity-centrism is clearly at work here, a number of revealing tensions flare up as 
this interpretative framework becomes operationalized in the UNAOC. First, the notion of ‘otherness’ 
employed by the Alliance is not completely free-floating, but anchored to two particular 
understandings of which ‘other’ the UNAOC should be concerned with. These two understandings are 
embedded in a tension, both within wider civilizational discourses and in the Alliance’s agenda itself, 
between a narrow set of ‘others’ and a more broad and open ended one. In the former, narrow sense, 
the principal others are the ‘West’ and the ‘Arab/Muslim world’, in the latter, broader sense, the other 
is understood in a general sense of diversity – in this case the other could be religious, linguistic, 
national, regional, ethnic, and so on.  
The tension between these two interpretations of self and other, both of which take place at the 
macro global as well as the micro local level, is first and foremost evident in the mission laid out for 
the UNAOC by the High-Level Group Report:  
“The analysis [of the report] focuses on relations between Western and Muslim societies though 
the approach taken by the High-level Group to this issue may serve as a reference for the bridging 
of other divides in the interest of establishing peace and harmony [emphasis added]” (UNAOC 
2006, 11).  
Much, although not all, of the UNAOC’s emphasis during what can be seen as its first operational 
phase, between 2006 and 2011, was placed on Western-Muslim relations. Zapatero’s 2004 speech at 
the UN, which sparked the initial interest in the Alliance itself, suggested that an alliance of 
civilizations was mostly needed “between the Western and the Arab and Muslim worlds”. Joining 
Spain, a Christian country with an important Muslim past, was Turkey, a Muslim country with a 
considerable Christian history. “Each of these two countries had ‘the other’ within, this was a 
powerful symbolism”, highlights Mustapha Tlili (2014, personal communication). At a time when 
narratives and perceptions of civilizational, cultural, and religious clashes were abounding between the 
West and Islam, the UNAOC’s mission would be to counter and dispel such discourses with 
alternative narratives and practical projects. 
Time and history have moved on since. The charged rhetoric and dynamics of the War on Terror 
have somewhat receded following the arrival of Barack Obama, the Middle East has been in the thralls 
of dramatic internal transformations brought about by the Arab spring from 2011 onwards, and global 
interests are also increasingly focusing on the possible threats or opportunities brought about by 
emerging powers, in general, and China, in particular. In this context, the UNAOC is widening its 
agenda from the narrow concern with West-Islam relations, towards putting the broader and general 
issue of managing identity pluralism and diversity more squarely at the center of its mission. In a way 
the UNAOC is increasingly attempting “to perform on the world stage”, as Camilleri and Martin 
(2014, 9) put it, “something of the functions normally assigned to national government departments or 
agencies entrusted with the task of managing cultural diversity within a national context” . 
One of the clearest expressions of this evolving agenda was articulated by UNAOC’s High 
Representative Nassir Abdulaziz al-Nasser in a 2014 lecture at Coventry University. In the lecture, the 
High Representative acknowledged that the UNAOC was born at a “critical juncture” when new forms 
of “fanaticism” risked “pitting the West against the Muslim World” as Huntington “predicted a decade 
earlier” (Al-Nasser 2014a). Yet, “beyond its immediate purpose”, he continued, “the new institution 
[i.e. UNAOC] was intended to equip the United Nations with a new tool of preventive diplomacy to 
apply to situations of cultural and identity tensions” rising from globalization. Al-Nasser (2014) would 
thus explain:  
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“…today more than at any other time in history — diversity is the reality that informs human life 
[…]The questions for the international community and policy makers in general are therefore: 
How to overcome the tensions generated by such a theory? How to manage diversity and turn it 
into an incubator of progress, peace, and security — locally, nationally, and internationally?” 
This move towards a broader agenda beyond Western-Muslim relations appears directed also towards 
bringing in greater participation in UNAOC activities (and funding) by Asian countries and societies. 
The extent to which these countries and societies are interested in being increasingly involved in 
UNAOC initiatives, and the degree to which the Alliance is actually bureaucratically capable and 
willing to open up and make itself relevant to Asia, is an open question. This issue will be addressed 
later in this section.  
A second tension embedded in scholarly and public discourses about identities, in general, and 
civilizations, in particular, pits the security dimension centered on the possibility/reality of ‘clashes’ 
against the peace-building ethos of ‘dialogue’ proposals. This tension manifests itself as well in the 
Alliance’s mission and activities. Whether it is in the case of the narrow West-Muslims agenda or the 
broader identity-based one, the conundrum between pursuing a conflict resolution and anti-terrorist 
mandate compared to a peace-building one continuously runs through the Alliance.
12
 
This security versus peace tension is evident in the Alliance’s very first implementation plan for 
2007-2009, where its stated goals were, on the one hand, to “improve understanding and cooperative 
relations among nations and peoples across cultures”, while on the other hand, “help counter the forces 
that fuel polarisation and extremism” (UN 2007, 5; see also UNAOC 2006, 3). Similarly, a 2014 
meeting of states and international organizations supporting the UNAOC, whose main theme was 
‘Strengthening International Cooperation in Preventing Terrorism’, reinforced the notion that the 
Alliance’s “overarching goals are to counter factors that cause polarization, radicalization and violence 
between and within communities” (UNAOC 2014, 1). While, in parallel, the High Representative has 
also been keen to emphasize, in a recent statement, that the UNAOC: “is more than a mechanism to 
address conflicts. The organisation’s distinctive programme […] make it uniquely suited to enhance 
cross-cultural engagement within and between countries, not least within regions” (Al-Nasser 2014b, 
4).  
As will be discussed in greater detail below, the UNAOC’s programmatic activity is mostly 
structured around four main themes: education, media, migration, and youth. Initiatives connected 
with these themes have to a great extent themselves exhibited this dichotomy between a peace-
centered or security-focused agenda. In particular, education and youth activities have tended to 
concentrate on the peace-building dimension, while the media and migration activities largely seek to 
address the anti-extremism and conflict-resolution dimension.  
Upholding these mirroring interests, either for a more peacebuilding stance or a more security-
oriented one, are two different constituencies that uphold and refer to the civilizational signifier. The 
roots of the former peacebuilding agenda are found in the dialogue movement. The intellectual 
tradition and experience of this movement spills into the UNAOC from two sources. First, the 
UNAOC was informed, although not explicitly linked in any direct way, by the experience of the 2001 
UN Year of Dialogue among Civilizations and the activities surrounding it promoted by Khatami of 
Iran.
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 Second, the Alliance’s strategic and operational mission was laid out in a report by a High-level 
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because of its focus on addressing the possibility of civilizational clashes between the West and Islam and issues of 
terrorism. Others (Camilleri and Martin 2014, 14), have highlighted, instead, the existence of a security versus peace 
tension in the organization’s mission and operations. 
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rhetorical declarations and operationally limited to encounters between cultural and religious leaders, the Alliance would 
be a more open-ended initiative focusing on funding a wider range of programs and actions, as well as targeting a broader 
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Group of ‘sages’, selected across cultures and regions, which comprised many exponents of a dialogue 
of civilizations interpretative framework, including Khatami himself.
14
  
On the other hand, states and international institutions have largely been keen to stress the latter, 
security, dimension (see for instance UNAOC 2014).
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 The choice of words for the initiative 
privileging an ‘Alliance’ over a ‘Dialogue’ of civilizations emblematically reflects this often uneasy 
encounter of interests and perspectives. As pointed out by some, while the term Alliance does suggest 
a notion of cooperation, it nevertheless also conjures images of war, conflict and military threats 
(Camilleri and Martin 2014, 1 -14; Kausch and Barre ada 2005, 17). “Alliances,” Camilleri and 
Martin (2014, 14) note, “are formed to counter a common enemy”. 
A third tension engendered by the interpretative logic of identity-centrism at the basis of the 
Alliance, revolves around who the UNAOC’s main stakeholders and the targets of its initiatives are, 
whether: governmental, intergovernmental and/or non-governmental. As Ferrara (2014, personal 
communication) points out: “there is a tension between a more traditional Westphalian state-centric 
agenda, and a more transnational focus, which is connected with the civilizations discourse”.  
UNAOC documents reveal an interpretative framework that goes beyond that of the state as the 
central referent-object, without however fully endorsing the centrality of the individual rights-barer as 
the alternative referent. The level at which the UNAOC understands itself as operating is that of 
relations within and among ‘societies’, ‘peoples’ or ‘communities’, which – despite being understood 
to belong to a common humanity – are seen to be divided along (mostly) civilizational, religious and 
cultural lines (UNAOC 2006, especially 4 and 8). It is at this level that states, individuals, and any 
other politically salient organized collective actor, are believed to be embedded. As the UNAOC 
website explains:  
“Since its inception, the UN Alliance of Civilizations has become a leading United Nations 
platform for intercultural dialogue, understanding and cooperation. It has connected governments, 
lawmakers, local authorities, civil society organizations, the media, and individuals devoted to 
promoting understanding across diverse communities”.
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Lachmann (2011, 197), describes the Alliance as “multilayered” where at “each level, the question of 
who can be considered a contributor to intercultural dialogue leads to choices about who is excluded 
and who is included”. Likewise, Isaías Barreñada (2006, 3) suggests that:  
“A crucial element of the proposal is the combination of the actors at the heart of it. The proposal 
is to bring together the United Nations (UN), governments and civil societies in an approach that 
responds more to a new kind of internationalism than to classic multilateralism”. 
In practice, this interpretative framework, manifests itself in a sort of “hybrid” (UNAOC Official 
2014, personal communication) institutional and operational structure. The UNAOC does not fit or 
compare easily with other UN entities: it is not a UN agency (like the UNDP or UNICEF), it does not 
belong to the UN Secretariat, nor is it in the office of the Secretary General – although the UNAOC 
High Representative does report directly to the Secretary General. It is “considered to be essentially a 
programme lasting as long as it is relevant”, which “sets it apart both from fully-fledged organizational 
structures and from being a time-limited activity of an organization” (Lachmann 2011, 193). 
(Contd.)                                                                  
range of stakeholders including political leaders and grass roots activists. For a more detailed comparison between the 
Dialogue among Civilizations and the Alliance of Civilizations, see Bloom (2013); Lachmann (2011). 
14
 For a list of the members of the group – which included leaders in the fields of politics, academia, civil society (including 
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UNAOC (2006). 
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as a helpful instrument in the fight against terrorism. 
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The Alliance has a small bureaucratic structure, with a secretariat composed of around ten to 
twenty officials depending on resources, headed by a High Representative housed in the UN New 
York headquarters, which manages and coordinates most of its activities. Furthermore, the Alliance 
does not have to report to the UN General Assembly nor does it officially depend on decisions by 
member states organized as an executive board of countries. States are still involved in the policy-
making process of the UNAOC, yet mostly through a voluntary-based Group of Friends,
17
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community of countries and international organizations which supports and promotes the Alliance’s 
objectives.  
For better or worse, this institutional configuration – limited bureaucratic capacity and member-
state intervention – both leaves greater leeway as well as forces the UNAOC to work and build 
partnerships with civil society actors: local or international NGOs, faith-based organizations, 
philanthropies and the private sector. This deep engagement with civil society is a particular feature of 
the UNAOC, which further distinguishes it from other UN entities. While other UN entities do 
maintain relations with civil society actors, these relations are generally subject to certain regulations 
and constraints and often occur in a rather hierarchical manner. The UNAOC, instead, has little or no 
constraints in its mandate to work with civil society, which the Alliance tends to approach more as 
equal partners. As a UNAOC Official (2014, personal communication) puts it:  
“In practice the UNAOC has introduced the concept that the ‘owners’ of the UN are not only the 
member states, but civil society actors, which also have a better knowledge and conscience of the 
cultural dimension of inter-human relations“. 
Reflecting the peculiarity of this ‘hybrid’ and ‘multilayered’ structure, UNAOC initiatives – whether 
directed towards addressing the narrow West-Islam agenda or the broader global diversity one – can 
be conceptualized as pitched on two different planes: one at a high-politics international level and the 
other at a more local or transnational grass-roots one.  
At the high-politics international level, the Alliance’s activities revolve around states, political 
leaders, and cultural elites. Practices here mostly center on influencing global public discourse and 
perceptions through symbolic gestures, speeches,
 
and media initiatives
18
 aimed at dispelling clash of 
civilizations narratives, showing that dialogue and engagement are a possibility, and improving 
understanding of the other. The High-Level Group Report (UNAOC 2006, 18-21) further envisioned a 
role for the UNAOC in contributing to resolving some of the most contentious political conflicts, 
which aggravated tensions between the West and the Muslim world.  
These included, for instance, finding solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to the 
mounting violence in Afghanistan and Iraq; creating a more consistent respect for multilateralism, 
international law and human rights; as well as supporting greater commitment to political pluralism in 
Muslim countries. While the UNAOC never really took up this role, it has promoted the development 
of national and regional strategies detailing how governments and multilateral institutions would work 
towards contributing to the UNAOC’s goals.19 
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 http://www.unaoc.org/who-we-are/group-of-friends/ (accessed 02/07/2014). 
18
 A particularly interesting project launched in 2008, which however appears somewhat dormant at the time of writing, is 
the Rapid Response Media Mechanism. The project is designed, in an era of 24-houre media cycles and breaking news 
events, to provide a database of “opinion leaders who provide quick reactions and accurate analysis to journalists 
worldwide on complex political, social and religious issues and crises…to help enhance understanding about complex 
and polarizing issues”. See http://www.theglobalexperts.org/about (accessed 02/07/2014). The mechanism was 
mobilized, for instance, to reduce the potential negative fall-out in anticipation of the release of right-wing Dutch 
parliamentarian Geert Wilders’ controversial anti-Islam film Fitna in 2008. An opinion piece co-signed by Muslim 
religious leaders from diverse regions and a slate of 10 experts from diverse regions prepared to provide insightful 
comment and analysis on the film through mass media outlets and consultations with influential civil society partners 
were prepared (UNAOC 2008, 6). 
19
 To date, twenty-seven Member States have submitted national strategies and there are three approved regional strategies 
with another four that are either under preparation or planned.  
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A substantial part of the Alliance’s activities, are in parallel directed at the grass-roots and civil 
society level. The High-Level Group Report would be instrumental in setting this agenda. “We 
recognize”, the Report (UNAOC 2006, 25) premises, “that mutual fear, suspicion, and ignorance 
across cultures has spread beyond the level of political leadership into the hearts and minds of 
populations”. A range of policies and programs would be proposed, in particular in the fields of 
education, youth, migration and media identified as potentially playing “a critical role in helping to 
reduce cross-cultural tensions and to build bridges between communities” (p.25). Since 200 , the 
UNAOC has thus funded and supported a wide range of civil society-led initiatives in these four 
fields, as well as partnering, promoting or coordinating a range of other programs such as exchange 
programs, conflict-resolution initiatives and projects in the fields of sports, music and entertainment.
20
 
These two largely distinct and separate high-politics and grass-roots levels, converge, meet, and 
interact in the yearly Global Forums. These forums bring together prominent personalities and 
scholars, political leaders, and policy-makers, along with partner civil society organizations from a 
wide variety of sectors and issues – such as community leaders, business, media, religious, youth, and 
women.
21
 High-level plenary sessions and final communiqués stressing the importance of inter-
civilizational dialogues and understanding, overlap with youth-led forums, inter-faith roundtables, or 
the launch of new locally specific grass-roots intercultural initiatives.  
The extent of participants’ diversity, across levels and sectors, as well as numbers – which in the 
case of the 2011 forum in Doha, Qatar, registered around 2.500 attendees – is quite unique in the 
context of other UN-sponsored yearly conferences and forums (Camilleri 2014; Uthup 2014). These 
have been mostly held in the past either in European or Middle Eastern sites,
22
 the 2014 forum instead 
takes place in Bali, Indonesia. The location is, again, quite symbolic for multiple reasons. The country 
is famous for its internal diversity, Bali was the site of a terrorist attack in 2002, and while the choice 
of Indonesia positions the Alliance quite prominently on the Asian map, it does so however within the 
borders of a country which hosts the largest Muslim population in the world.  
Lastly, given the extent to which the civilizations signifier in scholarly and public discourses is 
shot through and filled with references to religious traditions, interpretations, and communities 
(Eisenstadt 2000; Camilleri and Martin 2014, 19-33; Huntington 1996; Petito 2010), it is not 
surprising then to find that religion plays a critical role in the UNAOC’s thinking (UNAOC 2006, 9-
10) and practices (Uthup 2010). Religion is a particularly salient identity marker, both for the more 
narrow West-Islam agenda as well as for the broader global multicultural diversity one; it is 
considered a force for violence and conflict or peace and justice, which underpins the clash-dialogue 
tensions in the UNAOC’s mission; and religious leaders and organizations are among the civil society 
actors most keenly interested in partnering with the Alliance itself.
23
  
The Alliances’ founding documents and actions reveal an acute understanding of the increasing 
political salience that religion commands, especially in a post-9/11 world (UNAOC 2006, 9-10). 
Hence, despite the largely secular nature of the UN as an institution, the UNAOC has attempted to 
position itself as a credible interface at the global and local levels between religious leaders and 
political and societal actors, seeking to “encourage the positive role that religious leaders and 
communities can play in public debates, often in interaction with politicians and other civil society 
actors” (Uthup 2010, 408). The UNAOC has been particularly active in promoting inter-religious 
dialogues and initiatives, fostering better education and dispelling stereotypes about religion, funding 
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 http://www.unaoc.org/what-we-do/ (accessed 02/07/2014). 
21
 http://www.unaoc.org/global-forums/ (accessed 02/07/2014). 
22
 These being Madrid, Spain, in 2008; Istanbul, Turkey, in 2009; Doha, Qatar, in 2011; and Vienna, Austria, in 2103; with 
the exception of Rio De Janeiro, Brazil, in 2010. 
23
 As Aran Martin (2014, personal communication), a research associate at the Center for Dialogue La Trobe University, 
explains: “Some of the most committed people to inter-civilizational dialogue are in reality committed to inter-religious 
dialogue. Civilizational discourse can give more space and legitimacy to religious people in the public sphere”. 
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projects aimed at reforming madrassas, supporting faith-based organizations committed to dialogue 
and conflict resolution, and helping to undermine forms of religious extremism. “The Alliance”, Uthup 
(2014, personal communication) explains, “has become the principal UN entity that deals with religion 
as an issue, not solely as an actor as some other UN entities do in their frequent interaction with faith-
based organizations”. 
The Logic of Critique in Practice 
The second logic constitutive of the civilizations signifier, the ‘logic of critique’ against universalizing 
and homogenizing ‘end of history’ narratives, in general, and American power, in particular, is visibly 
at work in multiple ways in the creation and operation of the UNAOC. First and foremost, the Alliance 
was promoted by Spain and Turkey, and actively backed by Kofi Annan, as an alternative intellectual 
paradigm and multilateral diplomatic challenge to the Bush administration’s polarizing, securitized, 
and unilateralist War on Terror rhetoric and practices. Unsurprisingly the initiative received a 
lukewarm and skeptical reception by the United States itself.
24
 It has been only under the Obama 
presidency – when a new approach of engagement with the Muslim world and the broader 
international community emerged – that the United States finally joined the Alliance’s Group of 
Friends, in 2010.  
Furthermore, a vibrant critique, along post-colonial lines, of the West and the present world order 
tends to underpin the narrative of the High-Level Group Report. The threat of homogenization and 
uniformity that globalization presents to local cultures and traditional lifestyles, the widespread 
inequalities of wealth and power including the disproportionate influence that the West enjoys in 
multilateral political and economic bodies, the double-standards with which human rights and 
democratic norms are defended and promoted in the international system; are presented in the Report 
as some of the main factors creating “a fertile ground for the emergence of identity-based politics, 
which can, in turn, lead to violent tensions among communities and fuel hostile relations among them” 
(UNAOC 2006, 8).  
Furthermore, alimenting the growing mistrust which appears to exist between the West and 
Muslims and which extremists cynically exploit, the Report continues, is the “perception among 
Muslim societies of unjust aggression stemming from the West” (p.12). This perception, it is argued, 
has its roots in “European imperialism” (p.12) and is perpetuated by the “contemporary realities that 
shape the views of millions of Muslims” (p.17), such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, violence in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, or the discrimination faced by Muslim immigrants in Europe.  
In a more recent UNAOC Asia-South Pacific Regional Consultation, held in Shanghai in 
November 2012, similar critiques of the Western-centric liberal order were advanced by its 
participants. The consultation’s main objectives were twofold, explore how the Alliance could adapt to 
meet the needs of the region, and how the region’s “cultures and civilizations might contribute to the 
global conversation on the coexistence of cultures and values” (Camilleri and Martin 2014, 53). In a 
world where “rules [are] set largely by great powers [i.e. the West],” participants claimed, they also 
saw the “non-Western world [as] well placed to propose alternative models of interaction” (p.54). The 
UNAOC was seen, Camilleri and Martin (2014, 54) report, as having the potential to fulfill the “desire 
of non-Western countries to become actively engaged in the task of defining shared global norms”.  
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 The initiative was described as “sketchy” by the then US ambassador to Spain in a private diplomatic cable. See 
http://elpais.com/m/elpais/2010/12/06/actualidad/1291627040_850215.html (accessed 02/07/2014).  
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The Logic of Practicality in Practice 
The third logic, the ‘logic of practicality’, that underpins the use and diffusion of the concept of 
civilizations is further noticeable in the context of the UNAOC. First and foremost, Zapatero, Erdoğan 
and Kofi Annan all found an instrumental value in adopting and pushing the agenda of civilizational 
dialogue. All three saw substantial domestic and international political gains in visibly and publicly 
distancing themselves from the Bush administration. Not surprising then, Ferrara (2014, personal 
communication) explains, “the Alliance’s creation was taken in many quarters at the time as a highly 
politicized move in opposition to America’s and the neoconservative interventionist agenda”. Yet, 
rather than being seen simply as obstinate obstructionists, the UNAOC would provide a concrete 
alternative discourse and practice for legitimizing Zapatero’s, Erdoğan’s and Annan’s opposition to 
America’s war in Iraq.  
Likewise, civilizational discourses and dialogical activities such as the Alliance, received the 
backing of a number of key global powers seeking to balance America’s unconstrained unilateralism, 
such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin (Putin 2007; Rianovosti 2005), and the former Chinese President Hu 
Jintao (Jintao 2006 ). Moreover, one of the more general political functions that empty signifiers serve, 
that is uniting different social actors and movements, can be appreciated here, considering the 
ideological distance that existed between the secular and progressive Zapatero, and the religious and 
conservative Erdoğan.  
States and other international organizations see the Alliance as a potentially useful security tool to 
fight extremisms of different kinds and diffusing tensions and conflicts worldwide. The degree to 
which the UNAOC successfully serves this security purpose, and hence can command the continued 
interest by states, is an open question.  
Among the states that appear particularly keen in upholding the civilizational referent in the global 
public sphere are Muslim-majority ones. First of all, the Alliance thus far has provided ample space 
for action and visibility, at the highest in international diplomatic levels and multilateral forums, to 
leaders and officials of Muslim-majority countries. Second, Middle Eastern political figures are 
interested in competing for the symbolic capital that the civilizations signifier can bestow on the 
individual – Khatami, Erdoğan, or Arab leaders –, the state – Iran, Turkey, or Qatar – and culture – 
Iranian, Turkish or Arab – that can be perceived as the leader and model within the Muslim world and 
the authoritative representative for Muslims worldwide. Third, civilizational discourses and references 
to cultural particularities, can be exploited by Middle Eastern heads of states for dodging inconvenient 
questions regarding the poor application of human rights and democratic norms in their home 
countries.  
Likewise European countries and leaders benefit from their participation in the Alliance too. First, 
extolling the virtues of dialogue provides a convenient opportunity for deflecting questions and 
critiques levied against European states and societies for their treatment, stereotyping and 
discrimination of immigrants with Muslim backgrounds. Second, upholding a dialogue narrative has 
provided a convenient way for certain European leaders to differentiate themselves and their countries 
from the United States. Third, states and political figures not usually at the forefront of international 
diplomatic activities, such as Spain or Portugal, may have stood to gain gained in symbolic capital and 
recognition on the world stage by taking lead roles in the Alliance. 
Lastly, civil society actors – whether NGOs, religious groups, or academic institutions – are among 
those who have benefitted the most from the Alliance’s activities and projects. Indeed, in part due to 
the transnational ethos of the Alliance, and in part due the institutional constraints in implementing 
and managing programs, the UNAOC has actively sought to partner with civil society organizations. 
For many of these organizations, the UNAOC represents an important source of intangible legitimacy 
(i.e. the UN brand) and very tangible funding. Furthermore the Global Forums, have provided 
important venues for civil society actors to connect, showcase and promote their agendas and activities 
to other grassroots organizations worldwide, high-level policymakers, political authorities, and donors.  
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Conclusion: Future Prospects of the UNAOC and the Civilizations Signifier 
This working paper was motivated by a particular puzzle: why has the concept of civilizations gained 
the wide resonance in scholarly and public discourse at this historical juncture, ultimately, becoming 
operationalized within global governance institutions in 2005 with the UN Alliance of Civilizations? It 
argued for an understanding of the concept of civilizations as a particular kind of ‘empty signifier’, 
underpinned by three overarching logics that help to understand and explain its contemporary power 
and authority. These logics were described as: a logic of interpretation centered on identity, a logic of 
critique towards liberal ‘end of history’ narratives and projects, and a logic of practicality that matches 
the interests of multiple state and non-state actors.  
The workings of these three logics were then illustrated through an analysis of the UNAOC’s 
emergence and operationalization. This conclusion, however, is not intended to be a simple summary 
of this analysis. But rather it wants to point at how the logics that sustain the empty signifier of 
civilizations and structure much of the UNAOC’s mission, institutional architecture, and 
programming, also contain the seeds of the Alliances’ potential progressive demise.  
First, as history moves on, it remains to be seen the extent to which the UNAOC is institutionally 
and strategically capable of reframing its mission and broadening its horizon beyond the narrow issue 
of West-Muslim / European-Middle Eastern relations, and its security concern with terrorism. The 
challenge here is whether the Alliance can and will be able to globalize its agenda and open itself up to 
include the perspectives and interests of emerging powers, most notably in Asia. The UNAOC is 
aware of this challenge and a number of efforts are being made – in line with the identity-centrism that 
underpins the interpretative logic of the civilizational signifier – to reach out and make the Alliance 
more relevant to Asian countries, particularly China.  
A significant moment in the Alliance’s engagement with China was a 2012 UNAOC Asia-South 
Pacific Regional Consultation held in Shanghai laying the first steps for the development of a regional 
strategy. In recent remarks peppered with praises towards Confucian tenets and delivered during the 
opening session of the 2014 World Cultural Forum, in Shanghai, UNAOC’s High Representative Al-
Nasser (2014c) renewed the commitment to “welcome China’s active involvement” in all of the 
Alliances’ activities. It may be that, given China’s resistance to liberal norms (especially issues of 
human rights and democracy) and its parallel efforts to promote its culture worldwide through the 
Confucius Institutes, the country could develop an active interest in the Alliance’s framework.  
Results are mixed however. Multiple factors seem to be keeping the Alliance anchored to the 
narrow West-Islam dichotomy and further reproducing it also within the Asian context. First, New 
Zeeland and Australian governments and civil society organizations, generally recognized as the 
vanguard of the West in Asia, have been the keenest Asian partners of the UNAOC thus far.
25
 
Likewise, while the choice of holding the 2014 Global Forum in Bali, Indonesia, may appear in line 
with a more global agenda, a UNAOC Official (2014) cautions not “to read too much this event as 
‘opening up’ the Alliance to Asia”, since “Indonesia still remains quite situated in the 
terrorism/Muslim world paradigm”.  
The persistence of this narrow agenda, may be also delaying China’s engagement. In fact, the 
country has thus far not come forward with any substantial project or monetary proposal. 
Organizations such as ASEAN and most of its member countries, have not taken much of the 
Alliance’s agenda on board either. This is due, some argue (Camilleri and Martin 2014, 38), to a 
general skepticism within ASEAN towards empowering civil society organizations and opening up at 
the policy level the thorny issue of cultural, religious and ethnic tensions.  
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 UNAOC’s first engagement with the Asia region came in 2007, when New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clarke 
convened a symposium in Auckland to discuss the practical application of the Alliance to the Asia-Pacific region. The 
2012 Shanghai Regional Consultation, was proposed as a follow-up to the Auckland symposium by La Trobe 
University’s Centre for Dialogue, Melbourne, Australia (Camilleri and Martin 2014, 51). 
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In parallel, it remains to be seen whether the Alliance’s European and Middle Eastern political and 
economic backers are also interested in substantially pushing the UNAOC to engage with other 
regions and to broaden its mandate. In particular, Middle Eastern countries and Muslim leaders may 
stand to lose international power and prestige gained from playing a central role in the Alliance. So far 
two High Representatives have been appointed, the first from a European country the second from a 
Middle Eastern one. Key to know whether the UNAOC is serious about globalizing its activities, will 
be whether the next High Representative will come from a different region and cultural identity 
background compared to the previous ones. 
Second, the UNAOC is plagued by a constant shortage of funds that severely restricts its 
institutional and operational capacity. While inadequate resources are not a novelty for UN entities, 
the logics embedded in the civilizational signifier, in general, and in dialogical discourses, in 
particular, contribute to aggravating the Alliance’s situation. The Alliance’s ‘hybrid’ and 
‘multilayered’ institutional architecture – which is highly sensitive to civil society engagement, while 
in parallel not requiring compulsory state support and involvement – underpins a financial structure 
which is sustained by voluntary, rather than automatic, state contributions.  
In this context, funding becomes erratic and hard to come by. The appointment to High 
Representative of Al-Nasser, an uninspiring international diplomat and bureaucrat, seems driven more 
by the fund-raising imperative of tapping into Qatari resources, than providing the politically 
prominent and energetic leadership that an entity like the Alliance thrives on.  
Furthermore, the critical logic in the civilizations signifier underpinning the UNAOC, has 
contributed to limit the United States’ – along with some of its key allies – engagement and interest in 
the initiative. Many of the domestic and international imperatives that first pushed Spain and Turkey 
to cooperate and to provide the main sources of funding for the Alliance, especially in the highly 
contentious post-9/11 international atmosphere, have petered out with time. It is quite emblematic that 
at the last 2014 UNAOC Global Forum in Bali, neither the Prime Minister of Spain nor Turkey 
appeared. Possibly further compounding states’ loosening support, more generally, is the lack of 
proven effectiveness and measures of success especially in the security realm.
26
  
Thus the Alliance has increasingly sought support from the private sector and philanthropists to 
sustain its initiatives. Such a support may be seen in line with the UNAOC’s transnational and people-
centered outlook that elevates partnerships with civil society. Yet, this type of funding structure, 
however, is leaving the UNAOC with a decreasing amount of non-earmarked resources to plan 
strategically its activities, while making it dependent on fleeting funds earmarked for project-specific 
initiatives exposing the Alliance to the whims of individual business and philanthropic donors 
(UNAOC 2013, 19-20).  
Given all these uncertainties, what future lies ahead for the Alliance then? Tlili (2014) puts it as 
follows:  
“In theory the UNAOC should have a bright future – given the role and importance of ‘identity’ 
issues and anxieties in a globalizing world, important changes occurring in the Arab world, rise of 
extremist movements and parties in Europe – yet in practice it depends on member states and their 
support”. 
I take a slightly different view. Compared to Tlili’s argument, this paper was based on the assumption 
that there is never too much distance between theory and practice, between meanings and actions, 
interpretations and interests. Practice is embedded in and constituted by theory, and vice versa. Thus 
we could see member states’ support as fleeting also because the theory is. Like the UNAOC’s 
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 One of the few exercises in this regards, is Camilleri and Martin’s (2014, 12) quantitative-based discourse analysis 
recovering the Alliance’s successful role – according to their findings – in countering clash of civilizations narratives in 
media outlets. 
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functionality and dis-functionality are reflective of the power, but also contradictions, embedded in the 
logics underpinning the signifier of civilizations at this present historical juncture.  
This said, only time will tell whether identity-based issues will continue to be a central concern for 
scholars and practitioners of world politics, if cultural – rather than, say, economic – critiques of ‘end 
of history’ liberal narratives and projects become ever more dominant and entrenched in international 
society, and if civilizational references and discourses retain their practical power for states and non-
state actors. If all this were to happen, the UNAOC – or a similar entity that evolves to supersede it – 
is poised to have a brilliant future. Especially, since the Alliance will be at the operational forefront of 
a truly lasting shift in the way international politics is interpreted and practiced.  
The opposite may be true too, though. If the empty signifier of civilizations, and the three logics 
underpinning it, only managed to capture an intense but short-lived historical moment, then the 
UNAOC is likely destined for growing irrelevance. It may become one of the myriads purposeless 
entities – quickly launched, but hard to disappear – that populate the UN galaxy, like abandoned 
satellites orbiting the Earth. 
 
 
 
  
Gregorio Bettiza 
22 
References 
Alliance of Civilizations. 2006. Report of the High-level Group. New York: United Nations. 
Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin. 2011. A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations: Us and Them Beyond 
Orientalism. London: C. Hurst & Co. 
Adler, Emanuel, and Vincent Pouliot. 2011. "International Practices." International Theory no. 3 
(1):1–36. 
Al-Nasser, Nassir Abdulaziz. 2014a. Diversity Matters: Contemporary Challenges for Peaceful 
Relations. In Lecture at Coventry University by H.E. Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser United Nations 
High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations. http://www.unaoc.org/2014/05/lecture-at-
coventry-university-by-h-e-nassir-abdulaziz-al-nasser-united-nations-high-representative-for-the-
alliance-of-civilizations-diversity-matters-contemporary-challenges-for-peaceful/: accessed 
02/07/2014. 
———. 2014b. "Foreward." In The UN Alliance of Civilizations in Asia-South Pacific: Current 
Context and Future Pathways, edited by Joseph Camilleri and Aran Martin. The Centre for 
Dialogue, La Trobe University, Melbourne. 
———. 2014c. Remarks of H.E. Mr. Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, the UN High Representative for the 
Alliance of Civilizations before the Opening Session of The World Cultural Forum (Shanghai, 
China). http://www.unaoc.org/2014/06/remarks-of-h-e-mr-nassir-abdulaziz-al-nasser-the-un-high-
representative-for-the-alliance-of-civilizations-before-the-opening-session-of-the-world-cultural-
forum/: 25/07/2014. 
Arnason, Johann P. 2003. Civilizations in Dispute: Historical Questions and Theoretical Traditions. 
Leiden: Brill. 
Ayoob, Mohammed. 2007. "Challenging Hegemony: Political Islam and the North-South Divide." 
International Studies Review no. 9 (4):629-643. 
Balci, Ali. 2009. "The Alliance of Civilizations: The Poverty of the Clash/Alliance Dichotomy?" 
Insight Turkey no. 11 (3):95-108. 
Balcı, Ali, and Nebi Miş. 2008. "Turkey’s Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in 
Turkish Foreign Policy?" Turkish Studies no. 9 (3):387-406. 
Barreñada, Isaías. 2006. "Alliance of Civilizations, Spanish Public Diplomacy and Cosmopolitan 
Proposal." Mediterranean Politics no. 11 (1):99-104. 
BBC. 2013. The Clash of Civilizations? A Discussion on the Importance and Relevance of Samuel 
Huntington's Essay Twenty Years On. (accessed on October 22, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01hvfkm. 
Berger, Peter, and Samuel P. Huntington. 2003. Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the 
Contemporary World. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Berger, Peter L. 1999. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. 
Grand Rapids, MI: Ethics and Public Policy Center; Eermans Publishing. 
Bettiza, Gregorio. 2014. "Civilizational Analysis in International Relations: Mapping the Field and 
Advancing a ‘Civilizational Politics’ Line of Research." International Studies Review no. 16 (1):1-
28. 
———. 2014 forthcoming. "Constructing Civilizations: Embedding and Reproducing the ‘Muslim 
World’ in American Foreign Policy Practices and Institutions since 9/11." Review of International 
Studies. 
Empty Signifier in Practice: Interrogating the ‘Civilizations’ of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations 
23 
Bettiza, Gregorio, and Filippo Dionigi. 2014. "How do Religious Norms Diffuse? Institutional 
Translation and International Change in a Post-secular World Society." European Journal of 
International Relations (Online first):1-26. 
Blair, Tony. 2007. "A Battle for Global Values." Foreign Affairs no. 86 (1):79-90. 
Bloom, Tendayi. 2013. A Historical Overview of the Relationship Between ‘Intercultural Dialogue’ 
and Associated Terminology in UN-level Documents in the Twenty-First Century. In Migration, 
Media and Intercultural Dialogue: Policy Report UNU-GCM 01/02. 
Bowden, Brett. 2009. The Empire of Civilization: the Evolution of an Imperial Idea. Chicago, London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Braudel, Fernand. 1995. A History of Civilizations: Penguin Books. 
Camilleri, Joseph. 2014. Personal Communication. Phone conversation, June 2010. 
Camilleri, Joseph, and Aran Martin. 2014. The UN Alliance of Civilizations in Asia-South Pacific: 
Current Context and Future Pathways. The Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University, Melbourne. 
Casanova, José. 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Chandler, Daniel. Semiotics for Beginners: Glossary of Key Terms Online. Available from 
http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/sem-gloss.html. 
Chiozza, Giacomo. 2002. "Is there a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International 
Conflict Involvement, 1946-97." Journal of Peace Research no. 39 (6):711-734. 
Dallmayr, Fred R. 2002. Dialogue Among Civilizations: Some Exemplary Voices. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Dallmayr, Fred R., and Abbas Manoochehri. 2007. Civilizational Dialogue and Political Thought: 
Tehran Papers, Global encounters. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
De Bary, William. 1998. Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective: 
Harvard University Press. 
Dialogues. 2006. Who Speaks for Islam? Who Speaks for the West? 
Dunn, Kevin, and Patricia M Goff. 2004. Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical 
Elaborations. New York: Palgrave. 
Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. 1986. The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations. Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 
———. 2000. "The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas in the Framework of Multiple Modernities." 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies no. 29 (3):591-611. 
———. 2003. Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities. 2 vols. Leiden ; Boston: Brill. 
Elias, Norbert. 1994. The Civilizing Process. Oxford England ; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. 
Esposito, John L., and Dalia Mogahed. 2007. Who Speaks for Islam?: what a Billion Muslims Really 
Think. New York, NY: Gallup Press. 
Esposito, John L., and John O. Voll. 2000. "Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue." 
Millennium-Journal of International Studies no. 29 (3):613-639. 
European Union. 2009. Report on the Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat 
Terrorism. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st09/st09715-re01.en09.pdf.: accessed 
25/07/2014. 
Gregorio Bettiza 
24 
Ferrara, Pasquale. 2014. Personal Communication. Florence, Italy, June 2014. 
Foreign Affairs. 2013. The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate: Twentieth Anniversary Edition. New 
York: Foreign Affairs. 
Forst, Brian, and Akbar S. Ahmed. 2005. After Terror: Promoting Dialogue Among Civilizations. 
Cambridge ; Malden, MA: Polity Press. 
Fox, Jonathan. 2002. "Ethnic Minorities and the Clash of Civilizations: A Quantitative Analysis of 
Huntington's Thesis." British Journal of Political Science no. 32 (3):415-434. 
Glasze, Georg. 2007. "The Discursive Constitution of a World-Spanning Region and the Role of 
Empty Signifiers: The Case of Francophonia." Geopolitics no. 12 (4):656–679. 
Gong, Gerrit W. 1984. The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Gutmann, Amy. 1994. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Hall, Martin. 2007. "Toward a Fourth Generation in Civilizational Scholarship." In Civilizational 
Identity: the Production and Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations, edited by 
Martin Hall and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 199-206. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hall, Martin, and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson. 2007. Civilizational Identity: the Production and 
Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Halliday, Fred. 2002. Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East. 
Rev. ed ed. London: I. B. Tauris. 
Held, David. 1999. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture: Stanford University 
Press. 
Henderson, Errol A., and Richard Tucker. 2002. "Clear and Present Strangers: the Clash of 
Civilizations and International Conflict." International Studies Quarterly no. 45 (2):317-338. 
Hobson, John M. 2004. The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation. Cambridge, UK ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2007. "Deconstructing the Eurocentric Clash of Civilizations: De-Westernizing the West by 
Acknowledging the Dialogue of Civilizations." In Civilizational Identity: the Production and 
Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations, edited by Martin Hall and Patrick 
Thaddeus Jackson, 149-166. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hoge, James F. 2010. The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate. Second ed. New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations. 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1993a. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs no. 72 (3):22-49. 
———. 1993b. "If Not Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post-cold War World." Foreign Affairs 
no. 72 (5):186-194. 
———. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
Ikenberry, John. 1997. "Just Like the Rest." Foreign Affairs no. 76 ((March-April 1997)):162-3. 
Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006. Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of 
the West. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Jintao, Hu. 2006 Speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao at Yale University. http://ie.china-
embassy.org/eng/NewsPress/t259224.htm: 25/07/2014. 
Empty Signifier in Practice: Interrogating the ‘Civilizations’ of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations 
25 
Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. 
Ithaca, New York: Columbia University Press. 
———. 2010a. Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives. New York, N.Y.: 
Rountledge. 
———. 2010b. "A World of Plural and Pluralist Civilizations: Multiple Actors, Traditions and 
Pratices." In Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives, edited by Peter J. 
Katzenstein, 1-40. New York, N.Y.: Rountledge. 
———. 2012a. Anglo-America and its Discontents: Civilizational Identities beyond West and East. 
New York, N.Y.: Rountledge. 
———. 2012b. Sinicization and the Rise of China: Civilizational Processes Beyond East and West. 
New York, N.Y.: Rountledge. 
Kausch, Kristina, and Isa as Barre ada. 2005. Alliance of Civilizations International Security and 
Cosmopolitan Democracy: Seminar Conclusions. 
Kayaoğlu, Turan. 2012. "Constructing the Dialogue of Civilizations in World Politics: a Case of 
Global Islamic Activism." Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations no. 23 (2):129-147. 
Khatami, Mohammad. 2014. Khatami's speech at the Islamic Tehran Summit. Perspective Monde, 9 
December 1997 1997 [cited 13 March 2014 2014]. Available from 
http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMDictionnaire?iddictionnaire=1872  
———. 2000. Islam, Dialogue, and Civil Society. Canberra: The Centre for Arabic and Islamic 
Studies, the Middle East and Central Asia-ANU. 
Khatami, Mohammad, Josef van Ess, and Hans Küng. 2001. "Symposium: Islam, Iran and the 
Dialogue of Civilisations." Global Dialogue no. 3 (1). doi: 
http://www.worlddialogue.org/issue.php?id=16. 
Kinnvall, Catarina. 2004. "Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, identity, and the Search for 
Ontological Security." Political Psychology no. 25 (5):741-767. 
Kose, Talha. 2009. "The Alliance of Civilizations: Possibilities of Conflict Resolution at the 
Civilizational Level." Insight Turkey no. 11 (3):77-95. 
Lachmann, Niels. 2011. "In the Labyrinth of International Community: The Alliance of Civilizations 
Programme at the United Nations." Cooperation and Conflict no. 46 (2):185-200. 
Laclau, Ernesto. 1996. Emancipation(s). London: Verso. 
Lapid, Yosef, and Friedrich Kratochwil. 1997. The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. 
Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Linklater, Andrew. 2010. "Global Civilizing Processes and the Ambiguities of Human 
Interconnectedness." European Journal of International Relations no. 16 (2):155-178. 
Lukin, Alexander. 2014. "What the Kremlin is Thinking." Foreign Affairs no. 93 (4):85-93. 
Lynch, Marc. 2000. "The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres." Millennium-
Journal of International Studies no. 29 (2):307-330. 
Marchetti, Raffaele. 2009. "Mapping Alternative Models of Global Politics." International Studies 
Review no. 11 (1):133-156. 
Martin, Aran. 2014. Personal Communication. Phone conversation, June 2014. 
Gregorio Bettiza 
26 
Methmann, Chris Paul. 2010. "'Climate Protection' as Empty Signifier: A Discourse Theoretical 
Perspective on Climate Mainstreaming in World Politics." Millennium - Journal of International 
Studies no. 39 (2):345–372. 
Michael, Michalis S., and Fabio Petito. 2009. Civilizational Dialogue and World Order: The Other 
Politics of Cultures, Religions, and Civilizations in International Relations. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Modood, Tariq. 2013. Multiculturalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Mozaffari, Mehdi. 2002. Globalization and Civilizations. London: Routledge. 
Nabers, Dirk. 2009. "Filling the Void of Meaning: Identity Construction in U.S. Foreign Policy After 
September 11." Foreign Policy Analysis no. 5 (2):191–214. 
Neumann, Iver B. 2002. "Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: the Case of Diplomacy." 
Millennium-Journal of International Studies no. 31 (3):627-651. 
Nye, Joseph S. 2011. The Future of Power: PublicAffairs. 
O’Hagan, Jacinta. 2002. Conceptualizing the West in International Relations: From Spengler to Said. 
Houndmills, N.Y.: Palgrave. 
———. 2007. "Discourses of Civilizational Identity." In Civilizational Identity: the Production and 
Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations, edited by Martin Hall and Patrick 
Thaddeus Jackson, 15-31. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Offe, Claus. 2009. "Governance: An “Empty Signifier”?" Constellations no. 16 (4):550-562. 
Parekh, Bhikhu. 2008. A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdependent World: 
Palgrave. 
Pasha, Mustafa Kamal. 2007. "Civilizations, Postorientalism, and Islam." In Civilizational Identity: the 
Production and Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations, edited by Martin Hall 
and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 61-79. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Petito, Fabio. 2007. "The Global Political Discourse of Dialogue among Civilizations: Mohammad 
Khatami and   clav Havel." Global Change, Peace & Security no. 19 (2):103-126. 
———. 2010. In Defence of Dialogue of Civilizations: The Contemporary Ambiguities of Religions 
as a Source of Civilizational Identity in International Relations. Paper read at Dialogue of Cultures 
and Partnerships of Civilizations the Making of a Global Global Culture. 
———. 2011. "In Defence of Dialogue of Civilisations: with a Brief Illustration of the Diverging 
Agreement Between Edward Said and Louis Massignon." Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies no. 39 (3):759-779. 
Pew. 2006. The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other 2006 [cited 07/05/2012 
2006]. Available from http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/06/22/the-great-divide-how-westerners-
and-muslims-view-each-other. 
———. 2011. Muslim-Western Tensions Persist: Common Concerns About Islamic Extremism. 
edited by Pew Global Attitudes Project. Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center. 
Puchala, Donald J. 1997. "International Encounters of Another Kind." Global Society: Journal of 
Interdisciplinary International Relations no. 11 (1):5-29. 
Putin, Vladimir. 2007. SpeechDdelivered at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich. 
http://clcr.over-blog.com/article-putin-s-munich-speech-93308395.html: accessed 25/07/2014. 
Rianovosti. 2005. Putin: The UN Must Fight the Split of Civilizations. 
http://en.ria.ru/analysis/20050916/41415969.html: accessed 25/07/2014. 
Empty Signifier in Practice: Interrogating the ‘Civilizations’ of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations 
27 
Risse, Emanuel. 2002. "Transnational Actors and World Politics." In Handbook of International 
Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, 255-274. London, 
U.K.: Sage. 
Rosenau, James N. 1990. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Roy, Olivier. 2010. Holy Ignorance: When Religion and Culture Part Ways. New York: 
Columbia/Hurst. 
Ruggie, John Gerard. 1993. "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations." International Organization no. 47 (01):139-174. 
Said, Edward. 2001. "The Clash of Ignorance." The Nation. 
Salt, Jeremy. 2008. "Global Disorder and the Limits of ‘Dialogue’." Third World Quarterly no. 29 
(4):691-710. 
Salter, Mark B. 2002. Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations. London ; Sterling, Va.: 
Pluto Press. 
Scholte, Jan Aart. 2005. Globalization: A Critical Introduction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Sen, Amartya Kumar. 2006. Identity and Violence: the Illusion of Destiny. 1st ed. New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co. 
Shani, Giorgio. 2008. "Toward a Post Western IR: The Umma, Khalsa Panth, and Critical 
International Relations Theory." International Studies Review no. 10 (4):722-734. 
Suzuki, Shogo. 2009. Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European 
International Society. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge. 
Swidler, Ann. 1986. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." American sociological review no. 
51 (2):273-286. 
Tlili, Mustaha. 2014. Personal Communication. New York, USA, June 2014. 
Townshend, Jules. 2003. "Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: a New Paradigm from the Essex 
School?" British Journal of Politics and International Relations no. 5 (1):129–142. 
Toynbee, Arnold J., and D. C. Somervell. 1946. A Study of History: Abridgement of Volumes I-VI, by 
D.C. Somervell. London ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Tsutsumibayashi, Ken. 2005. "Fusion of Horizons or Confusion of Horizons? Intercultural Dialogue 
and its Risks." Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 
no. 11 (1):103-114. 
Tsygankov, Andrei P. 2008. "Self and Other in International Relations Theory: Learning from Russian 
Civilizational Debates." International Studies Review no. 10 (4):762-775. 
UN. 2006. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Resolution Adopted by the 
General Assembly 60/288. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/terrorism/Index/60-288en.pdf: accessed 
25/07/2014. 
———. 2007. Alliance of Civilizations: Implementation Plan, 2007–2009. 
http://www.unaoc.org/repository/implementation_plan.pdf.: accessed 02/07/2014. 
UNAOC. 2006. Report of the High-Level Group. New York: United Nations. 
———. 2008. Alliance of Civilizations: Annual Report of the High Representative for the Alliance of 
Civilizations http://www.unaoc.org/wp-content/uploads/090917_Report-published-by-GA.pdf 
accessed 25/07/2014. 
Gregorio Bettiza 
28 
———. 2013. Alliance of Civilizations: Sixth Annual Report of the High Representative for the 
Alliance of Civilizations http://www.unaoc.org/wp-content/uploads/UNAOC-Formal-Report-
6th_English-version.pdf: accessed 25/07/2014. 
———. 2014. Group of Friends Meeting – Permanent Representatives’ Level: Summary Report. 
http://www.unaoc.org/wp-content/uploads/140228_UNAOC-GoF-Meeting-Feb-14-2014-
Summary-Report.pdf: accessed 02/07/2014. 
UNAOC Official. 2014. Personal Communication. New York, USA, June 2010. 
United Nations. 2007. Alliance of Civilizations: Implementation Plan, 2007–2009. 
http://www.unaoc.org/repository/implementation_plan.pdf.: accessed 02/07/2014. 
Uthup, Thomas. 2010. "Bringing Communities Closer: The Role of the Alliance of Civilizations 
(AoC)." Cross Currents no. 60 (3):402-418. 
Uthup, Thomas 2014. Personal Communication. Phone conversation, June 2010. 
Walker, Rachel. 1989. "Marxism-Leninism as Discourse: The Politics of the Empty Signifier and the 
Double Bind." British Journal of Political Science no. 19 (2):161-189. 
Walt, Stephen M. 1997. "Building Up New Bogeymen." Foreign Policy no. 106 (Spring 1997):176-
89. 
Weiming, Tu. 2000. "Implications of the Rise of "Confucian" East Asia." Daedalus no. 129 (1):195-
218. 
Wendt, Alexander. 1994. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." American 
Political Science Review no. 88 (2):384-396. 
Zakaria, Fareed, and Lee Kuan Yew. 1994. "Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew." 
Foreign Affairs no. 73 (2):109-126. 
 
 
 
  
Author contacts: 
 
Gregorio Bettiza 
University of Exeter 
Department of Politics  
Amory Building  
Rennes Drive  
EX4 4RJ Exeter  
United Kingdom 
Email: g.bettiza@exeter.ac.uk 
 
 
